Dive deep into a fascinating geopolitical framing—applying Halford Mackinder’s 1904 Heartland theory to assess how Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s (or their successors’) visions might position the U.S. to lead in a projected 2032 world of multipolarity.
Mackinder’s core idea remains prescient: Control of Eurasia’s “Heartland” (broadly, the resource-rich pivot from Eastern Europe through Central Asia to Siberia) could enable dominance over the “World-Island” (Eurasia-Africa), and by extension, the globe.
For the U.S.—as a maritime “rimland” power—this means prioritizing alliances, economic decoupling, and strategic denial to prevent a cohesive Russia-China axis from consolidating Heartland power, especially amid rising threats like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and de-dollarization efforts.
By November 2025, with Trump back in the White House for a second term, we’re seeing early indicators of how these approaches play out in real time. Biden’s tenure (2021–2025) emphasized multilateral coalitions to encircle Eurasia, while Trump’s return has leaned into transactional realism—pausing Ukraine aid to push for negotiations, brokering a Gaza ceasefire via a bold 20-point plan, and redirecting resources toward domestic resilience. Both leaders (now aged 79 and 82, respectively) are unlikely to run in 2028, let alone lead in 2032, but their policy DNA will influence successors like JD Vance (Trump-aligned) or a Harris/Gabbard hybrid (Biden-esque).
The question: Whose framework better safeguards U.S. primacy against Eurasian hegemony in a 2032 marked by U.S.-China tech rivalries, Russian revanchism, climate-induced migrations, and fractured supply chains?
Key Geopolitical Challenges for 2032
Projections from think tanks like CFR and Brookings paint a volatile landscape:
- Eurasian Consolidation: The SCO (China-Russia-led) could encompass 60%+ of global GDP (PPP) by 2030, dominating Arctic routes, rare earths, and energy flows via BRI extensions into Africa. De-dollarization accelerates with BRICS alternatives.
- U.S. Vulnerabilities: National debt exceeds $40 trillion; energy transitions strain grids amid EV/AI demands; alliance fatigue from Ukraine/Gaza lingers, with NATO spending up 30% under Biden but now questioned under Trump.
- Opportunities: U.S. retains an AI/semiconductor edge (via CHIPS Act legacies) and rimland footholds like AUKUS, QUAD, and Abraham Accords to “hem in” the Heartland.
A Mackinder-aligned strategy demands rimland control (Europe, Middle East, Indo-Pacific) to isolate the Heartland—blending sea power (alliances) with land-power disruption (sanctions, deals).
Trump vs. Biden: A Non-Partisan Comparison
Drawing on their records—Biden’s full term and Trump’s ongoing second—here’s a structured breakdown. I’ve incorporated 2025 updates for currency.
| Aspect | Trump’s Approach (2017–2021 & 2025+) | Biden’s Approach (2021–2025) | Mackinder Alignment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eurasia Containment (Russia/China) | “America First” redux: LNG exports to Europe spiked 50% post-Ukraine; 2025 reshoring incentives via tax credits boosted manufacturing (e.g., steel up 20%). Tariffs sparked the 2018–2020 trade war but cut U.S.-China deficit by $100B. Debt focus: Proposed 2026 cuts to foreign aid. | Multilateral sanctions post-Ukraine invasion ($175B+ in aid); built AUKUS/QUAD to counter SCO in Indo-Pacific. Retained tariffs but added tech export bans (e.g., advanced chips). Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) aimed at rimland economic ties. | Diplomatic pushes (e.g., 2024 Gaza proposal via UN) but enforcement lagged; Iran nuclear revival stalled amid Houthi attacks. China brokered the Saudi-Iran thaw (2023), extending Heartland influence. Gaza aid surged ($20B+), but U.S. approval dipped to 14% on perceived bias. |
| Middle East Leverage | Decisive realism: Expanded Abraham Accords; 2025 “Twenty-Point Gaza Deal” secured Phase 1 ceasefire (Hamas disarmament, international force deployment, Qatar/Egypt mediation), curbing Iran-SCO links. Filled “vacuums” with Saudi-Israel normalization talks. | Transactional pressure: Pressed NATO allies for 2% spending (achieved by 2024); imposed tariffs decoupling U.S.-China trade (supply chains reshored 15% by 2025). On Ukraine: Paused direct aid in early 2025, shifting coordination to the UK/EU for “orderly negotiations,” enabling a tentative Minsk III framework. Vs. China: Export controls tightened, but pragmatic outreach on fentanyl/TikTok bans. | Trump aligns with Mackinder’s raw leverage to secure rimlands (e.g., denying Iran Heartland access via proxies). Biden’s idealism fostered short-term humanitarian wins but allowed Eurasian footholds (Russia-Iran arms pacts). |
| Economic Resilience | Polarizing strength: NATO spending rose under pressure, but the 2025 Ukraine aid pause fueled “America Alone” doubts (global approval ~35%). Yet, Gaza deal boosted Middle East cred. | Infrastructure Act ($1T) and CHIPS/IRA ($500B+) secured semiconductors/green tech. Inflation peaked at 9% (2022), eroding dollar trust; alliances diversified supply chains (e.g., friend-shoring with India/Vietnam). | Biden is ideological in long-game coalitions to isolate Eurasia (e.g., QUAD vs. BRI). Trump’s unilateralism yields quick rimland wins but risks fracturing the anti-Heartland web—vital as China nears parity by 2030. |
| Global Image & Alliances | Rebuilt trust: NATO expanded (Finland/Sweden); Ukraine aid rallied $100B+ from allies; U.S. favorability hit 50%+ in Europe/Asia. Gaza handling tarnished image in the Global South. | Institutional steward: At 89, a multilateral heir (e.g., Buttigieg) excels at norms but is critiqued as “weak” (Afghanistan 2021 exit echoed in 2025 Gaza delays). Strong on sustained containment via tech edges. | Trump is better for innovation/autarky in chaos; Biden for coalition depth. Age bars both—successors must hybridize. |
| 2032 Suitability | Disruptive innovator: At 86, a Vance-like successor could channel “deal-maker” energy for multipolar realism (e.g., AI pacts with India to counter China). Health/divisiveness a risk, but focus on U.S. interests suits fractured alliances. | Polarizing strength: NATO spending rose under pressure, but the 2025 Ukraine aid pause fueled “America Alone” doubts (global approval ~35%). Yet, the Gaza deal boosted Middle East cred. | Trump’s plan is better for innovation/autarky in chaos; Biden’s is for coalition depth. Age bars both—successors must hybridize. |
Who Is Best Suited? A Mackinder Verdict
Through a Mackinder prism, Trump’s framework (or a successor’s iteration) “makes the cut” in 2032, which fortifies the “web” needed for “Heartland Unity and Security”, echoing Mackinder’s sea-power counter to land empires.
Alan J. Mackinder
